

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-04 L-02 NSAE-00

OIC-01 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02

SS-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 AECE-00 /068 W

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O P 231635Z OCT 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0527

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0339

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: SPC DISCUSSION OF AIR MANPOWER SCHEDULED FOR
OCTOBER 24, 1974

REF: (A) USNATO 5851; (B) MBFR VIENNA 0318; (C) MBFR
VIENNA 0327; (D) MBFR VIENNA 0291; (E) STATE 229321;
(F) USNATO 5690

1. WE ATTACH HIGH PRIORITY TO ACHIEVING RAPID AGREEMENT
IN NATO ON THE CONCEPT OF PLACING SOME UPPER LIMIT ON
AIR MANPOWER FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES.

2. THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS INITIATED DISCUSSION OF THE
DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WITH THE EAST ON OCTOBER 15.
WE EXPECT TO DEAL WITH THE SUBJECT AGAIN IN GREATER
DETAIL AT THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION ON OCTOBER 29.
THE TACTICAL SITUATION ON THAT OCCASION WILL PROBABLY

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REQUIRE THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS MAKE THE POINT THAT

THE NUMBERS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL ON THE TWO SIDES AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, IT WOULD NOT OFFSET THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DISPARITY TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION BASE. PUTTING FORWARD THIS POINT WILL PROBABLY LEAD TO DISCUSSION, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THE EASTERN SIDE CAN BE EXPECTED TO INSIST THAT AIR FORCES SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE REDUCED. TO PROVIDE A VALID TEST OF THE STRENGTH OF EASTERN INTEREST IN SUCH REDUCTIONS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BE IN A POSITION, AT THE FOLLOWING INFORMAL SESSION ON NOVEMBER 5, TO MAKE A NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL. TO ALLOW TIME FOR PREPARATION, NAC GUIDANCE SHOULD BE RECEIVED NO LATER THAN NOVEMBER 1.

3. LATEST SPC DISCUSSION OF THE AIR MANPOWER ISSUE ON OCTOBER 21 INDICATES CONTINUING AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY AND RAISES A QUESTION WHETHER GUIDANCE CAN BE PROVIDED IN TIME. IT MAY BE HELPFUL THEREFORE FOR WASHINGTON AGENCIES AND USNATO TO PLACE THE ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE. IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED TO REDUCE GROUND FORCES ALONE, THE ALLIES WOULD CONSIDER ANY SUBSEQUENT LARGE-SCALE INCREASES IN WARSAW PACT AIR MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA AS UNDERMINING THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE ALLIES WILL ULTIMATELY FIND IT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE TO PLACE AN UPPER LIMIT OF SOME TYPE ON EASTERN AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE RECIPROCAL.

4. ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM THIS CONSIDERATION IS THE CONTINUING STRONG EASTERN INTEREST IN REDUCING AIR FORCES. EVEN IF THE ALLIES ULTIMATELY DECIDE NOT TO REDUCE AIR FORCE MANPOWER, SOME LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE MINIMUM NEEDED TO MEET EASTERN REQUIREMENTS AND TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY AS REGARDS THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES, THE ALLIES WOULD FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY REFUSAL TO PLACE ANY LIMITATION ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER, HAVING ALREADY PROPOSED A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR GROUND FORCE MAN-
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POWER.

5. THE FIRST UK SUGGESTION IN PARA 2 OF USNATO 5851 THAT THE ALLIES COULD OFFER A SPECIFIC NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION TO EXCLUDE AIRMEN FROM ASSUMING TASKS CURRENTLY UNDERTAKEN BY GROUND FORCES MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR INCLUSION IN THE FINAL TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT LIMIT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRMEN

AND THEREFORE DOES NOT MEET EITHER ALLIED OR EASTERN INTERESTS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. MOREOVER, IT COULD HAVE DISADVANTAGE OF FORECLOSING EVEN A LIMITED FREEDOM TO MIX BETWEEN ALLIED AIR AND GROUND FORCES.

6. THESE CONSIDERATIONS SUGGEST THAT IT IS LIKELY THERE WILL BE AN UPPER LIMIT OF SOME KIND ON THE SIZE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND THAT THE ALLIES ARE CONSEQUENTLY FACED WITH THE QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF LIMITATION WILL BEST SERVE THEIR INTERESTS.

7. WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE DESIRE OF THE FRG TO AVOID PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD GIVE THE EAST ANY ADDITIONAL GROUNDS TO PRESS FOR REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER. WE NOTE GERMAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, REPORTED IN BONN 16609, THAT MAIN PROBLEM IS ONE OF FORMULATION.

8. A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE WHICH EXPLICITLY COVERED THE LEVEL OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA WOULD MEET THE NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS STATED IN PARAS 3 AND 4 ABOVE. HOWEVER, A NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH HAS THE DRAWBACKS, RELATIVE TO A NO-INCREASE APPROACH, INDICATED IN PARA 7 OF MBFR VIENNA 0291 AND IN STATE 229321. WE CONTINUE, THEREFORE, TO PREFER THE NO-INCREASE APPROACH.

9. USNATO 5851 (PARA 2) REPORTS SECOND UK SUGGESTION, PUT FORWARD AT OCTOBER 21 SPC MEETING, THE THE EFFECT THAT THE ALLIES COULD PROPOSE, AS AN ADJUNCT TO

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0339

FROM US REP MBFR

THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON GROUND FORCES, A NO-INCREASE LIMITATION ON "OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL" OR "OTHER FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA." SEEN FROM VIENNA, WE DO NOT THINK THIS SUGGESTION IS FULLY ADEQUATE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD ONLY BE A CIRCUMLOCUTION FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER, ITS VAGUENESS WOULD MAKE IT LESS ADEQUATE AS A MEANS OF DEALING WITH EASTERN PRESSURES. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE GERMAN POSITION ACCURATE THAT PLACING A LIMIT ON SOMETHING CREATES A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER ABOUT IT. BUT EVEN IF THE GERMANS THINK OTHERWISE, WE DOUBT THAT THIS FORMULATION WOULD GIVE MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST EASTERN DEMANDS FOR REDUCTION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER SINCE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO TELL EAST THAT IT WOULD IN FACT LIMIT AIR MANPOWER.

10. THE UK SUGGESTION COULD ALSO AS UK SPC REP ACKNOWLEDGE
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LEDGED, HAVE THE EFFECT OF CREATING SEPARATE GROUND AND AIR CEILINGS. AND THE VAGUENESS OF THE UK LANGUAGE REGARDING "OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL" OR "OTHER FORCES" CONFUSES THE ISSUE AND COULD RAISE PROBLEMS REGARDING NAVAL, RESERVE AND PARAMILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA.

11. AS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED IN MBFR VIENNA 0291, 0318, AND 0327, WE WOULD PREFER THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE: BEGIN QUOTE: ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO SUGGEST TO THE EAST THAT AIR MANPOWER COULD BE BROUGHT UNDER A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT, IN THIS EVENT, SOME LIMITED AGREED EXCEPTIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO PROVIDE FOR NORMAL EXERCISES AND ROTATIONS. ALLIED REPS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM GOING INTO FURTHER DETAILS AT THIS TIME, TELLING EASTERN REPS THAT QUESTIONS OF

DETAIL WOULD BE DEALT WITH AT A LATER STAGE WHEN SPECIFICS OF ALL SUGGESTED COMMITMENTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED. END QUOTE.

12. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE, IF THE ALLIES CANNOT REACH AGREEMENT QUICKLY ALONG THE LINES OF THE ABOVE FORMULATION, THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO TRY A SIMPLER APPROACH, THE ESSENCE OF WHICH WOULD BE TO LEAVE OPEN FOR THE TIME BEING BOTH THE NATURE (NO-INCREASE VERSUS NON-CIRCUMVENTION) AND THE ACTUAL FORMULATION OF AN ALLIED COMMITMENT. WE WOULD SUGGEST, ACCORDINGLY, THAT WASHINGTON CONSIDER INSTRUCTING USNATO TO PROPOSE AS A COMPROMISE THAT THE ALLIES AGREE ON THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP.

QUOTE: THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO TELL THE EAST, THAT, ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES CONTINUE UNWILLING TO REDUCE AIR FORCE MANPOWER, IN THE EVENT OF AGREEMENT ON A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA, THEY WOULD BE WILLING ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS TO PLACE SOME FORM OF UPPER LIMIT ON THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD REFRAIN FROM GOING INTO FURTHER DETAILS AT THIS TIME,

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TELLING EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE FORM OF SUCH A LIMITATION AS WELL AS OTHER QUESTIONS OF DETAIL WOULD BE DEALT WITH AT A LATER STAGE WHEN THE SPECIFICS OF ALL SUGGESTED COMMITMENTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED. END QUOTE.

13. AN APPROACH TO THE EAST ALONG THESE LINES WOULD MEET THE IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS ADEQUATELY, THOUGH NOT FULLY. MEANWHILE, THE SPC COULD CONTINUE TO STUDY THE OPEN ISSUES OF WHAT TYPE OF LIMITATION AND WHAT FORMULATION OF IT WOULD BE MOST FAVORABLE TO ALLIED INTERESTS. SUCH FURTHER SPC STUDY WOULD, MOREOVER, PROCEED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INITIAL EASTERN REACTIONS TO THE GENERAL CONCEPT. RESOR

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